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CASE SUMMARIES
CERLCA
Nevada Depart. of Transp. v. U.S., 925
F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996).
The State of Nevada
Department of Transportation (NDOT)
acquired a piece of property in
Henderson, Nevada as part of a
highway right-of-way in 1987. It was
subsequently discovered that the site
contained hazardous waste materials,
including chlorine and magnesium,
that had been produced for the war
effort during World War II. The
NDOT, Stauffer Management Co., and
Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. jointly filed a
cost-recovery action against the
United States and Atlantic Richfield
Co. (ARCO) for site remediation
efforts under the authority of §107(a)
of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA). ARCO was
named as a defendant as a
predecessor-in-interest to the
Anaconda Mining Company and
Basic Magnesium Inc., which were
responsible for the dumping of the
hazardous substances. The NDOT
alleged the existence of previously
incurred costs, as well as future
cleanup costs, stemming from the
release or threatened release of waste
materials. There were no genuine
issues of material fact in this case.
ARCO moved for summary
judgment asserting that CERCLA
liability could not be applied to the
pre-enactment dumping by a
predecessor-in-interest. The
Magistrate Court issued a Report and
Recommendation (R&R) to the District
Court on the defendants' summary
judgment request, supporting denial
of the motion. Despite objection by
ARCO, the R&R was adopted by the
District Court with minor revisions.
ARCO contended that the
summary judgment was proper in
favor of the defendants for a series of
reasons. First, ARCO argued that use
of negative implication to assess
response cost liability for pre-
enactment hazardous material
dumping is no longer valid following
the Supreme Court decision in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products (114
S.Ct. 1483). Negative implication has
been used by courts when
interpreting CERCLA to determine
environmental liability for the release,
or threatened release of hazardous
material. InLandgraf, however, the
Court eliminated the use of negative
implication to incur retroactive liability
in Title VII cases pending appeal prior
to enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act. Therefore, ARCO contended
that previous CERCLA case law is
overturned, and can now only be
applied in a prospective manner.
Second, ARCO argued that
congressional acceptance of deletion
of an express retroactive provision
during the drafting provided evidence
that Congress did not have clear
intent in retroactive application of
CERCLA. Third, ARCO further
argued that the Magistrate was
incorrect in his reliance on U.S. v.
Shell Oil (605 F. Supp. 1064
(D.Colo.1985) because it reversed the
presumption against retroactive
liability which is not permissible under
theLandgrafholding. Finally, ARCO
argued that the overall lack of clarity,
and overweighing partisan
controversy in the legislative history
of CERCLA concerning retroactive
application of liability, precludes the
finding of clear intent required by
Landgraf to overcome the
presumption.
CERCLA has been
interpreted by the courts since its
enactment as applying retroactively in
determining environmental liability for
the release or threatened release of
hazardous materials. There is not an
explicit retroactive liability clause
within CERCLA, but such liability has
been found through the use of
negative implication, such as found in
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the lead appellate case United States
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co. (8 10 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
An explicit retroactive liability
limitation was inserted in CERCLA
concerning natural resource damage
liability. There was no such limitation
on remediation response costs.
Therefore by use of negative
implication, an impressive body of
CERCLA case law has been created in
support of applying in providing for
retroactive liability for response
costs..
The District Court denied the
summary judgment. The court
recognized the presumption against
retroactive liability was a continuing
and valid doctrine. However, it
determined that this presumption
could be overcome in light of
overwhelming evidence, including
textual evidence and through
legislative intent found in the statute's
legislative history in favor of
retroactive application. The court
found that the Supreme Court in
Landgraf was not forbidding the use
of negative implication in statutory
construction, but instructing lower
courts when examining statutes to
take into account the overall intent
behind the entire statute rather than
just expanding the intent of particular
provisions within the statute to
overbroad application. The court
concluded that the presumption
against retroactive application of
statutes still exists in substantive
matters under Landgraf, unless the
statute only affects procedure.
The district court quickly
dismissed ARCO's secondary
arguments following a lengthy
discussion of established case law in
light of the court's position. The
court held that the deletion of the
express retroactive application clause
did not affect the impact of the
statute's intent in its entirety.
Moreover, the statute's effective date
was found irrelevant to retroactivity
issues because it is simply an
initiation point for filing suit not an
indicator of prospective application.
In addition, the lack of clarity found
by ARCO was not seen by the court.
Instead, the court found that when
examining CERCLA in its entirety,
congressional intent clearly indicated
its desire for retroactive application
for response costs, with specific
limitations on natural resource damage
liability.
- by Christopher Pickett
Lion Oil Company, Inc. v. Tosco Corp.,
90 F.3d 268 (8th Cir. 1996).
Lion filed suit against Tosco
under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§9601 et seq.,
for indemnification of costs
associated with the cleanup of
hazardous waste on its oil refinery
site. The site was purchased by Lion
from Tosco in 1985.
During its ownership, Tosco
constructed two hazardous waste
management units (HWMUs) and
operated several solid waste
management units (SWMUs). The
HWMUs and SWMUs were used to
handle hazardous materials produced
by the oil refinery. When Lion
purchased the oil refinery from Tosco,
the parties prepared an Asset
Purchase and Sale Agreement. The
agreement provided that Tosco would
indemnify and hold Lion harmless for
costs, fines, penalties and liabilities
resulting from environmental harms
arising from any of Tosco's pre-
closing date actions, including harms
not yet inflicted or discovered. The
agreement specifically referred to any
liabilities arising under CERCLA
violations. In 1986, the parties
executed an Amendment and Release
in which Lion released Tosco from any
rights and claims Lion may have had
against them under the
aforementioned clauses of the Asset
Purchase and Sale Agreement. In
1988, Lion applied for a Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) permit to close the HWMUs.
The permit required Lion to correct
any leakage or potential leakage of
hazardous materials from the SWMUs
which occurred in violation of
CERCLA. The requirement prompted
to initiate this suit under CERCLA, for
contribution of clean-up costs from
Tosco.
Lion Oil Company (Lion)
appealed the grant of judgment on the
pleadings in favor of Tosco
Corporation (Tosco) by the United
States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas. On appeal, Lion
argued that the district court erred in
finding that the Agrcement and
Release comprised a general release of
Tosco's CERCLA liability.
The court found that the
indemnity agreement entered into by
Tosco and Lion was of the type
permitted under CERCLA. It reasoned
that courts enforce such contracts
whenever the provisions of the
contract manifest a "clear and
unmistakable intent" of the parties to
do so.
Lion argued that the
contracts were ambiguous and
therefore should be supplemented by
extrinsic evidence to clarify the
ambiguity. The court, however,
referred to Arkansas state law which
adopts a "plain meaning" point of
view. Thus, the court decided that
because the words used in the
contracts were not unclear or
ambiguous on their face, the parol
evidence rule prohibited the
admission of extrinsic evidence to
alter the "otherwise ambiguous
contracts."
The judgment of the trial
court was affirmed.
- by Rebecca J. Grosser
Gopher Oil, Co. v. Bunker, 84 F.3d
1047 (8th Cir. 1996).
Gopher Oil brought a
declaratory judgment action against
the Germaine Romness estate (the
"Estate") under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), the Minnesota
Environmental Response and Liability
Act (MERLA), and Minnesota tort
and contract common law, Gopher
sought to have the Estate declared
liable to the extent of Gopher's liability
for the release of hazardous
substances prior to Gopher's
ownership of the site.
In the 1960s, Gopher State Oil
Inc. owned and operated a hazardous
waste dump site known as Brooklyn
Park. Gopher's only shareholders
were Charles and Germaine Romness.
Bame Oil acquired Gopher State Oil
through a stock acquisition from the
Romnesses in 1973. In accord with
the stock transfer, the Romnesses
indemnified Bame with respect to any
of Gopher State's liabilities at the time
of closing. Bame Oil then assumed
Gopher State's liabilities and
distributed the assets to itself,
changing its name to Gopher Oil.
Although both of the Romnesses are
deceased, Germaine's estate remains
open.
After Bame Oil acquired
Gopher state, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) discovered
hazardous substances at the Brooklyn
Park site. The EPA expended in
excess of $1.3 million dollars to clean
the site. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
75, as amended, authorizes the EPA to
institute cost recovery actions against
those parties responsible for the
environmental contamination. In
January 1994, the EPA requested
reimbursement from each of ten
parties, including Gopher Oil,
potentially responsible for the
contamination, stating the EPA's
expectation to bring suit the following
year.
Gopher Oil filed this
declaratory judgment action against
the Germaine Romness estate on four
counts. Gopher alleged that the
Estate is liable under CERCLA and
MERLA, Minn.Stat.Ann. §§ I 15B.0I-
115B.24 (West 1987 & Sup. 1994-95) to
the extent of Gopher's liability.
Gopher also sought for declaration of
the Estate's primary tort liability to the
extent of Gopher's liability to the EPA
based on the fact that the Romnesses
actively owned the site at the time of
the release. Finally, Gopher requested
indemnity based upon the 1970
agreement between Bame Oil and the
Romnesses regarding the Gopher
State acquisition. The district court
granted the Estate's motion to dismiss
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court held the claims were not
ripe because at the time Gopher
initiated this declaratory judgment
action, the EPA had not filed suit for
the CERCLA violation naming Gopher
as a defendant. The court also issued
summary judgment in favor of the
Estate on the MERLA, tort, and
contract law claims on the basis of
collateral estoppel.
In March 1996, the EPA filed
a CERCLA cost recovery suit against
Gopher Oil. On appeal, Gopher
appeals the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. The Estate cross appeals.
arguing that the court should have
dismissed the complaint because of
Gopher Oil's assumption of Gopher
State's liabilities, and because the
complaint fails to state causes of
action under CERCLA, MERLA, or
contractual indemnity.
The Eighth Circuit upheld the
district court on the MERLA and tort
claims because no actual controversy
existed. Specifically, there was no
immediate threat of either type of
liability. However, because a CERCLA
liability suit had been instituted
against Gopher, the summary
judgment as to this issue was
reversed. The Court followed the
holding of Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380,
1389 (5th Cir. 1989), which states that
before the cost-recovery case is
initiated, a potentially responsible
party (PRP) cannot seek judicial
review of the EPA. The Court
determined the CERCLA issue to be
ripe. Because one of CERCLA's goals
is to avoid piece-meal litigation, the
court remanded for further
determination on effectuating that
goal.
The Minnesota Court of
Appeals (referring to MERLA)
previously held that these
environmental liabilities were not
contemplated at the time of the
agreement. Therefore, because
MERLA was not enacted, or pending,
at the time of the acquisition
indemnity agreement, the liabilities
could not have existed at closing. The
Court adopted by analogy the Court
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of Appeals reasoning and applied it
using CERCLA, upholding the district
court's dismissal regarding the
contractual indemnity agreement
issue.
-by Rebecca J. Grosser
Board of Regents of the University of
Washington v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 86 F.3d 1214
(D.C.Cir. 1996).
The Tulalip Landfill (the
landfill), which operated from 1964 to
1979, was placed on the National
Priorities List (NPL), by the
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) under the authority of the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675. The NPL is a prioritized list
of disposal sites that require urgent
environmental remediation, The
leachate leakage at the landfill was
detected by the EPA in 1988, in both
pond water formation on the top of
the landfill and through a berm.
The placement of a
contaminated site on the NPL is
determined by a Hazard Ranking
System (HRS) value based on a multi-
factor formula calculation. A HRS
value of 28.5 or higher is necessary for
a site to be placed on the NPL. The
EPA in its final listing decision for
Tulalip HRS assigned a value of 50 to
the landfill.
The petitioners were
potentially responsible parties for
remediation costs. Balance Council, a
Washington State "labor and
business" organization intervened in
the suit. The petition sought judicial
review of the EPA listing decision
placing the landfill on the NPL. The
review claim focused on challenging
the EPA's environmental threat factor
determinations in the HRS formula as
arbitrary and capricious. The
disputed threat factors were primarily
the sources of the hazardous
substances detected, reliance on the
testing laboratories analysis, and the
location of the landfill itself.
The most significant
challenge to the listing concerned the
water samples of the hazardous
substances at the land fill discovered
during the 1988 site inspection.
Petitiners challenged the method used
for obtaining a water sample at the
site. Two principle methods of
retrieving water samples exist. The
first method is a filtered sample,
typically used in conjunction with an
invasive groundwater test, wherein
the natural metals in the soil are
filtered out so as to remove potential
for biasing the data. The second
method uses the unfiltered sample to
test surface water, wherein the
naturally occurring soil metals are
undisturbed which may allow for risk
of potential contaminant
overstatement. The petitioners
contended that the Tulalip samples
should have been filtered rather than
unfiltered, and thereby reducing the
HRS value of samples. The court
rejected this argument upholding the
EPA's practice of using unfiltered
samples, even with the risk of being
over-inclusive.
Concerns raised by the
petitioners, alleging possible other
reasons for contamination, were
rejected in deference to EPA technical
expertise in interpreting sample data
from the landfill.
Next, the petitioners argued
that the laboratories contracted to test
the samples were inadequate in their
general performance and tracing
documentation. Such inadequacies
could skew the results so as to make it
unreasonable for the EPA to rely on
such information. It was shown that
there were irregularities within certain
contracted laboratories during the
time the Tulalip sample testing was
conducted. The court held that such
irregularities, while potentially
increasing the risk of inaccurate
results, did not preclude the EPA from
relying on analysis from those
laboratories. The court noted that the
EPA is not held to a perfection
standard but one which is to "assure,
to the maximum extent feasible" the
level of contamination at the tested
sites.
The location classification of
the Tulalip landfill also was a decisive
factor in the determination of the NPL
listing. The EPA concluded that the
landfill was located within wetlands
and adjacent to a National Estuary
Program study area. This
determination alone was sufficient to
score the landfill with a HRS value of
30. The petitioners' initial brief states,
in conclusory fashion with no
supporting evidence, that this
determination was arbitrary in that
there was no independent EPA
determination of the existence of
wetlands surrounding the Tulalip site.
This point was later expanded in the
reply brief, precluding a response, to
conclude a new argument of incorrect
reliance on the part of the EPA in the
form of outdated information
concerning the wetlands
determination in the Tulalip area. The
Court upheld the EPA wetlands
determination by holding that issues
not raised until the reply brief are
waived.
Petitioners' subsidiary
arguments along with several
respondent procedural motions were
dismissed as moot. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the Tulalip
listing on the NPL was valid and not
in contravention of the arbitrary and
capricious standard established under
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
- by Christopher Pickett
RCRA
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S.
CL 1251 (1996).
Respondent is the owner of a
Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant
operated on land in Los Angeles
County. The county health
department ordered KFC Western, Inc.
to clean up contaminated soil on the
site discovered during the restaurant's
construction in 1988. Three years after
KFC removed the soil at a cost of
$211,000 the company brought suit
against the land's former owners, Alan
and Margaret Meghrig. KFC's
contention is that the Meghrigs are
responsible for "equitable restitution"
for the cleanup costs KFC incurred
because, as previous owners of the
land, they were contributors to the
site under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(a), (1988 ed.).
The District Court dismissed
the case on the grounds that the
waste at issue did not pose an
imminent danger to the environment at
the time the suit was filed in
accordance with language that
requires such in § 6972 (a) (1) (B) of
the RCRA. The court held further that
§ 6972 (a) of the Act does not allow
recovery for cleanup costs that have
been incurred in the past. This
decision was overturned by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which found
the District Court had authority to
award compensation for past costs
incurred in a cleanup. The Court of
Appeals upheld KFC's assertion that
it was enough if the waste at issue
presented imminent danger at the time
of the cleanup. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear this case
because the Ninth Circuit's decision
directly opposed the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d
1092,1100-1101 (1995), and because
the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
RCRA language addressing imminent
danger in an unprecedented fashion.
The Supreme Court began its
analysis by contrasting the goals of
the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability
Act against RCRA's objectives. The
purpose of CERCLA, Justice
O'Connor wrote, is cleanup of
hazardous waste and compensation of
costs, while the RCRA is primarily
targeted at reducing production of
such waste and dealing with it
properly once produced. Justice
O'Connor rejected the Ninth Circuit's
remedy of awarding past cleanup
costs. Her analysis in a plain reading
of the statute was determinative that
RCRA § 6972 allows a private citizen
suit to seek only a mandatory or
prohibitory injunction (i.e. one that
demands that a responsible party take
action or refrain from further
violation). Justice O'Connor
contrasted this remedial scheme with
the types of relief provided for in
CERCLA, which include recovery of
removal costs by the government,
response costs incurred by others. and
contribution from a party liable or
potentially liable for these costs. 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (A) & (B); § 9613
(f) (1), (1988 ed.). Justice O'Connor
concluded that the deliberate absence
of this language in RCRA's remedial
scheme demonstrates Congress did
not intend to provide relief for past
cleanup costs in the RCRA.
The Supreme Court further
stated that RCRA § 6972 (a) (1) (B)
allows a private party to sue when the
waste at issue "may present an
imminent and substantial
endangerment of health or the
environment." Justice O'Connor
defined imminent as an immediate
threat and concludes that this section
was designed toward reducing
present or future risks of harm, not
past. The lack of two additional
factors, a statute of limitations and a
requirement that response costs
sought are reasonable, make RCRA
what she labeled an "irrational
mechanism" for private parties to seek
compensation for past costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit on the basis that past
cleanup costs cannot be recovered
under RCRA and the Act permits suit
by a private party only if the waste at
issue poses an immediate threat, not
that it did pose a threat at some time in
the past.
- by Wendy Hickey
CAA
Ober v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 84 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996).
Petitioners challenged the
EPA's approval of Arizona's State
Implementation Plan (SIP) for the
control of airborne particulate matter
pursuant to the Clean Air Act.
Petitioners, a group of Phoenix
citizens, alleged the SIP violated the
Clean Air Act because the plan failed
to: (1) address the 24-hour standard,
(2) consider transportation control
measures as presumptively
"reasonably available control
measures" and (3) provide adequate
state assurances for implementation of
the plan.
The Arizona SIP addressed
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the impracticability of attainment of
the PM- 10 annual standard and not
the PM- 10 24-hour standard. The 24-
hour standard concerns the expected
number of days per calendar year
where a 24-hour average
concentration above 150 micrograms
per cubic meter is equal to or less than
one. The annual standard is attained
when the expected annual arithmetic
mean concentration is less than or
equal to 50 micrograms per cubic
meter. The EPA took the position that
since the annual standard could not
be obtained, the Phoenix area would
have to be reclassified as a "serious
nonattainment area." Therefore, it
was unnecessary to address the 24-
hour standard.
The Court of Appeals agreed
that failure to meet one standard was
sufficient to reclassify the area as
"serious." However, due to the
different functions of the standards,
the Court held that the SIP must
address both the annual and the 24-
hour standard. The Ninth Circuit
determined that the 24-hour standard
protects against short-term exposures
to high PM-10 levels as opposed to
the long-term protection afforded by
the annual standard. In addition, the
court found that the standards are
affected by different sources. The 24-
hour standard is affected by local
sources, including construction
projects. In contrast, the annual
standard is controlled by more diverse
and dispersed sources. Due to these
differences, the court concluded that
lack of compliance with one standard
will not excuse compliance with the
other, including the situation in which
non-compliance with one standard
causes reclassification of the area as a
"serious" nonattainment area.
The court further ruled that
Arizona also violated the Clean Air
Act by failing to perform an air quality
modeling for the 24-hour standard or
failing to demonstrate attainment of or
the impracticability of attaining that
standard. In addition, Arizona also
neglected to meet the "reasonable




petitioners claim that the
Transportation Control Measures
were presumptively "reasonably
available control measures." In
Delaney i. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1990), the Court held that the
measures listed in 42 U.S.C. § 7408
were presumed reasonably available.
In order to reject any of these
measures a state must show that the
measure would not advance
attainment, would cause adverse
impact, or would take too long to
implement. Petitioners argued that
Arizona did not meet the requirements
of Delaney. However, Delaney was
decided before the 1990 Amendment;
and therefore, the EPA was no longer
bound by that decision. The Court
held that the EPA did not abuse its
discretion by rejecting the contention
that the Transportation Control
Measures were presumed to be
"reasonably available". Instead, the
reasonableness of the control
measures should be based on local
circumstances.
The Court also rejected
petitioner's claim that the EPA's
approval of the Implementation Plan
violated the Clean Air Act because
the plan failed to provide necessary
assurances by the State for the
implementation of plan provision that
rely on a local or regional government
or agency, as required by 42 U.S.C. §
741 0(a)(2)(E)(iii). 'e EPA did not
abuse its discretion in determining
that the Implementation Plan had
adequate assurances, in that
Arizona's statute clearly addressed
state responsibility and action for
enforcing plan provisions that rely on
local and regional entities.
Petitioners also asserted that
the EPA violated the Administrative
Procedures Act when it: (1) accepted
and relied on additional information
justifying the rejection of certain
control measure submitted after the
comment period; (2) substituted its
own determination of "reasonable
further progress" and (3) included in
the PM- 10 Implementation Plan
measures from the Carbon Monoxide
and Ozone Implementation Plans. The
Court upheld petitioners first
contention, and remanded the case to
the EPA to provide an opportunity for
public comment on the post-comment
period justifications for rejecting
control measures and on the
"reasonable further progress"
demonstration.
The Court also awarded
attorneys' fees and expert witness
costs to petitioners pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 7607(f).
- by Tom Collins
Texas Municipal Power Agency v.
EPA, 89 F3d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
The 1990 Amendment to the
Clean Air Act included provisions to
limit acid rain by means of marketable
permits. This case concerns the
original distribution of permits.
Petitioners in the case were several
utilities claiming that they had been
"shortchanged" in the distribution of
permits. The court denied all of the
utilities claims.
First, the court held that
petitioners' claims were not barred by
statutory restrictions on judicial
review. Section 402(4)(C) of the Act
provides that "corrections" to the
allowances are not subject to "judicial
review." The court struggled with the
problem of how to decide if the issue
in the instant case was a "correction"
or just an addition, and if the
provision barred both substantive and
procedural claims to the same extent.
The court found that the section did
not bar any of the claims at issue in
the case. The court also held that the
provision dictating that actions
brought under the Act be filed only in
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was
a venue provision only. Because the
EPA had failed to object, the venue
requirement had been waived.
The court next examined the
plaintiffs' substantive claim.
American Municipal Power-Ohio,
Inc. ("AMP-Ohio") claimed that the
EOA had improperly used average
sulfur content of fuel burned by
AMP-Ohio plant when calculating the
sulfur amount for the purpose of
distributing the permits. Since the
data that the EOA typically used to
calculate the emissions of a given
electric utility were not available for
AMP-Ohio's plant, the EPA allowed
AMP to submit figures. However,
AMP's figures were inadequate, the
EPA used the average sulfur content
data. An AMP-Ohio plant was
included in the allowances on the
National Allowance Database
(NADB), but less than AMP-Ohio
expected. Therefore, AMP-Ohio
raised a number of substantive and
procedural claims.
Substantively, the court held
that the EPA's interpretation of the
term "actual emission rate" did not run
against the statue or Chevron
analysis. The court found that the
statue did to address what the EOA
should do when the database it was
using did not include a plant, such as
in AMP-Ohio's case. In the absence,
the court followed the second part of
the Chevron analysis and found that
the agency' solution was reasonable.
The court noted that the EPA had
published that data it expected to
have from companies in AMP-Ohio's
position, and the EPA was under no
duty to repeatedly warn a party when
its submission does not meet the
published requirements. Procedurally,
the court held that the EPA did not err
when it did not affirmatively correct
AMP-Ohio's submissions of emission
rates because an agency does not
have to respond to comments if the
answer to the comment has already
been answered in a published notice.
The EPA also did not err when it used
a calculated emission rate rather than





complained about the denial of any
allowances for their plants because
they had not met the statutory and
administrative deadlines to submit
data. IMPA claimed it did not submit
figures because its plants were new
and it misunderstood that the
reporting set out in 1991 applied to
1992 units. The court held that since
parties in this claim could not have
reasonably concluded that a 1991
notice did not apply 1992 units, the
claim must be denied. The IMPA
neither submitted the data in time, nor
did they do anything to demonstrate
why the data was unavailable.
Wyandotte's claims were dismissed
on similar grounds.
Texas Municipal Power
Authority ("TMPA") argued that the
EPA misread a section of the Act that
allows adjustments for "prolonged"
plant outages. As a result, TMPA
contended that the EPA should have
allowed TMPA an adjustment units
fuel consumption in the measuring
period for a month long shutdown.
The EPA had interpreted the statutory
language allowing for allowances from
"prolonged" shutdowns to be three
calendar months. Again, the court
performed a Chevron analysis. The
court found the term "prolonged" to
be ambiguous. However, the court
found the EPA's interpretation, that
"prolonged" equaled three months, to
be reasonable. Three months was
longer than the average outage, but
not so long as to effectively remove
the provision from the statute. The
court also dismissed various
procedural claims raised by TMPA.
Last, Nebraska Public Power
District Southwestern Public Power
District, Southwestern Public Service
Company and Arco Coal Company
(collectively, "NPPD"), contended that
the EPA misread a statue governing
the conversion of disparate emissions
into a standardized form. NPPD
contended that the EPA erred because
the provision applies to only
measurements taken at one instance in
time rather than a yearly average. The
court, however, pointed out that this
petitioner's argument was without
merit, noting that the NPPD could not
point out why Congress would fail to
require limitations in one form, but not
in another.
- by Kevin Murphy
CWA
Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Union Oil Company of California, 83
F.3d 1111 (9" Cir. 1996).
Citizens for a Better
Environment (CBE) brought an action
under the Clean Water Act (CWA),
claiming that Union Oil (UNOCAL)
violated effluent and clean water
standards. The court held that the
citizen suit could continue even
though UNOCAL had paid a
settlement to avoid state prosecution,
because the settlement did not come
under a CWA rule precluding citizen
suits where the state has already
conducted enforcement actions.
UNOCAL operates an oil
refinery in the San Francisco Bay area.
Waste water from the plant must meet
standards set by the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board.
Water quality standards were raised,
and UNOCAL could not meet the
standards, citing technological
difficulties. UNOCAL and other
refineries entered into a cease and
desist order (CDO), which had the
effect of letting UNOCAL make a
payment to the Regional Board (of
which UNOCAL's share was $780,000)
that would let UNOCAL comply with
the limits in 1998 rather than
immediately. CBE filed suit. The
district court held that a subsequent
citizen suit was not precluded by 33
USC §1319(g)(6)(A)(ii-iii), which is
designed to restrict citizen suits to
situations where there is a "final order
not subject to judicial review," and
there is "penalty" that has been
assessed under that subsection or
"comparable state law."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that §1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) did not
apply to this lawsuit based on the
"penalty" and "comparable state law"
language of the section. In deciding
that the provision did not apply, the
court held that the payment of money
to the Regional Board was not a
"penalty." First, UNOCAL had
insisted on characterizing the money
as a "payment" rather than a penalty,
in order to maintain an air of good
standing for the company, and to
avoid a scrutiny regarding the "nature
and amount" of a penalty. The court
pointed out that UNOCAL could not
have it both ways: if it wanted to
avoid the "penalty" language earlier, it
could not avail itself of the benefits of
that language later. CBE had also
pointed out that while penalties were
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due within a certain time limit,
UNOCAL's payment would have been
significantly after expiration of the
time limit. Having held that the
settlement was not a "penalty," the
court addressed whether the
settlement had also been under
"comparable state law."
The court held that the CDO
had not been written under
"comparable state law." The court
expressly refused to adopt the
reasoning of North and South Rivers
Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d
552,555-556(1" Cir. 1991). The court's
first reason was that a plain reading of
§ 1319 meant that the provision that
authorized the CDO would have had
to be specifically for the purpose of
setting penalties. The court disagreed
with UNOCAL's argument that the
California provision authorizing the
CDO, though not a penalty statute,
was part of the same statutory
scheme, thus constituting
"comparable state law." In addition,
the court noted that § I31 9 (g) penalty
required public notice and comment
procedures. The California provision
authorizing the CDO gave no
analogous opportunity. Third, if the
California statute authorizing the CDO
were considered a analogous penalty,
then state environmental action would
preclude more citizen suits than
federal environmental rules.
The court also held that
§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), which precludes
citizen suits if the State "has
commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an action under a State
law comparable to this subsection,"
would not bar a citizen suit. The court
had already held that the CDO was
not under "comparable state law." In
addition, since the CDO had already
been entered, there was no longer
ongoing "enforcement."
Finally, the court held that
the CDO did not effectively delay the
compliance date for discharges of the
type that UNOCAL were putting into
the bay. UNOCAL had argued that
the CDO served to change UNOCAL's
compliance date, which would have
meant that CBE had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be
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granted. The trial court had held that
the CDO was the equivalent of
prosecutorial discretion and did not
act as a shield against a citizen suit.
The instant court agreed with the trial
court, and added that 33 USC § I342(o)
contains an "anti-backsliding"
provision, which is a substantive
restriction on regulators so that any
new water standard will be more
restrictive than the one it replaced.
Where the CDO to create a later
compliance date, the court ruled that it
would be precluded by the anti-
backsliding provision.
- by Kevin Murphy
In re Marine Shale Processors, Inc.,
81 F.3d 1371 (5th Cir. 1996).
The EPA instituted suit
against Marine Shale Processors, a
hazardous waste treatment facility, for
alleged violations of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), the Clean Air Act ("CAA")
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in
the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. The District
Court found that the facility had
violated the provisions of all three
acts. Marine Shale was fined and
permanent injunctions prohibiting
further violations were granted
against Marine Shale. Marine Shale
appealed the decision.
This case arises from a
petition for mandamus involving two
issues. First, the status of the
coercive relief ordered against Marine
Shale and second, Marine Shale's
request for coercive relief against the
EPA. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
continued the injunctions and the
stay pending a supplemental opinion
from the district court explaining its
decision to issue the injunctions.
Judge Duplantier issued a ruling on
the motion orally and on the record.
He stated that Marine Shale was
asking the court to permit it to operate
pending the very lengthy process of
pursuing an application from the State
of Louisiana for a permit to operate as
an incinerator of hazardous waste.
Moreover, Judge Duplantier stated
that he had no authority to allow
Marine Shale to operate without a
license or to prevent the EPA from
interfering with Marine Shale
operations.
The refusal to exercise the
equitable power of the court to stop a
certain activity does not render the
activity legal or immune from further
action. See Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). In other
words, staying the injunctions against
Marine Shale did not make their
activities legal. Therefore, the stay is
still in place pending formal findings
of fact and conclusions of law (in
accord with FRCP 65(d)) from Judge
Duplantier either explaining his
decision, lifting the stay or dissolving
the injunctions.
Marine Shale also requested
an order preventing the EPA from
interfering with its operations,
including (1) taking any action against
Marine Shale during the application
process, (2) exercising its
prosecutorial power against Marine
Shale's customers, and (3) informing
inquiring entities as to the agency's
litigating position. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court
that it had no power to grant such an
extraordinary motion. Marine Shale
cited no statute, constitutional
provision, or source of law providing
a court the right to gag the EPA or
prevent them from exercising their
power to respond to violations of the
RCRA. Therefore, the petition was
denied.
- by Tom Collins
NEPA
Swanson v. United States Forest
Service, 87 F.3d 339 (9' Cir. 1996).
The Idaho Sportsmen's
Coalition (ISC) challenged United
States Forest Service's (Service) sale
of timber on National Forest land in
Idaho. ISC alleged that the Service
did not comply with the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
the National Forest Management Act
(NMFA), and the Clean Water Act
(CWA) in the timber sales. Part of
ISC's claim specifically related to the
Snake River's chinook salmon, an
endangered species. The circuit court
denied all of ISC's claims. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision, observing that
ISC provided little support for most
allegations, and dismissed the Clean
Water Act claims on procedural
grounds.
The dispute arose from the
Service's sale of two portions of the
Nez Perce National Forest in Idaho. In
preparation for the timber sales, the
Service conducted assessments of the
affect logging would have in the area,
including the effect on sensitive
animal species, such as the chinook
salmon. The Service found that the
logging would have no effect. After
the sales were awarded, but before the
transactions had been completed, the
chinook salmon was upgraded from a
"sensitive species" to an "endangered
species." The Service delayed the
sales to conduct further study on
whether the salmon would be affected
by the sales. The Service again found
that the sales would have no
significant effect on the salmon. At
the time of filing briefs, one sale had
been completed, and the other was
near completion.
ISC filed its complaint in
September 1993, alleging that the
Service had violated several
environmental statutes because the
pre-sale studies had been inadequate.
ISC specifically alleged that the
Service had made inaccurate reports
and had failed to consider the impact
of the sales on animal habitat and
recreational activities in the area. ISC
was granted a temporary injunction.
The court sustained the
lower court's holding that the Service
complied with NEPA and NMFA
claims. The court noted that the
NEPA is a procedural statute, in place
to ensure that agencies take a "hard
look" at the environmental impact of
government projects. The court held
that the government took an adequate
hard look at the timber sales, including
comprehensive reviews of the effect
on animal species, recreation, visual
quality, cultural resources, wilderness,
the recreation industry, and game.
The court refused to "fly-speck" the
Service's environmental analysis.
The court also held that the
addition of the chinook salmon to the
endangered species list was not a
significant circumstance to require an
supplemental EIS because the
salmon's legal status had changed,
but its status in the wild had been
unchanged. Therefore, the earlier
analysis, the court held, was still valid.
Finally, the court held that the Service
had complied with NMFA
requirements that species in the area
must be monitored. The court pointed
out that the ISC had little support for
its claims, since the Service was
conducting continued monitoring in
several areas.
The court dismissed ISC's
Clean Water claims because of late
filing. The court also refused to allow
ISC to incorporate outside sources
into their brief.
- by Kevin Murphy
Inland Empire Public Lands Council
v. United States Forest Service, 88
E3d 754 (911 Cir. 1996).
The plaintiffs, a number of
environmental groups, challenged
timber sales in the Upper Sunday
Creek Watershed region of the
Kootenai National Forest by the
United States Forest Service.
Plaintiffs claimed that the Service's
analysis of the impact of the seven
species - the lynx, boreal owl,
flammulated owl, black-backed
woodpecker, fisher, bull charr, and
wet-sloped cutthroat trout - was
inadequate under both the National
Forest Management Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act of
1969.
The district court concluded
that the Service's analysis was
sufficient and granted summary
judgment for the Service and refused
to enjoin the sales. The plaintiffs
appealed, arguing first that the service
failed to comply with 36 CFR § 219.19,
which requires a minimum level of
population viability analysis. Second,
the plaintiffs contended that the
Service violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
because the viability analysis it did
perform only examined the effect of
the timber sales on wildlife
populations living within the project
boundaries. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district
court.
The appellate court
concluded that the habitat
management analysis conducted by
the Service for the black-backed
woodpecker, lynx, fisher, and boreal
owl was not in any way "plainly
erroneous" or "inconsistent" with the
regulatory duties under 36 CFR §
219.19. They further decided that the
Service's methodology reasonably
ensured the viability of populations
by requiring that the decision area
contain enough of the types of habitat
essential for survival. The court
recognized that the Service's
methodology assumes that
maintaining the acreage of habitat
necessary for survival would in fact
assure a species' survival. The court
found, however, the assumption
reasonable and that the Service's
habitat analyses for the black-backed
woodpecker, lynx, fisher, and boreal
owl were not arbitrary or capricious.
Moreover, the court did not
find the less rigorous analysis
performed for the flammulated owl, the
bull charr trout, and the wet-sloped
cutthroat trout arbitrary and
capricious. The court concluded that
the Service's failure to engage in a
more intensive analysis for the bull
charr trout and the wet-sloped
cutthroat trout was understandable
since neither species would be
affected by the timber sales. Also, the
Service's treatment of the flammulated
owl was reasonable. The Service did
not engage in a more extended
analysis of the owl's nesting and
feeding habitat requirements because
such data were unavailable. The court
held that an analysis that uses all the
scientific data currently available is a
sound one.
Finally, the court concluded
that the Forest Service performed its
duty under NEPA. The Service never
limited its analysis of cumulative
effects to the Upper Sunday area. In
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addition, the court declared that
adoption of the plaintiffs' position as
a rule of law would be impractical. If
adopted, an agency would have to
analyze separately each species to
determine the area covered by its
particular ecosystem and then analyze
its population viability in that area.
The Ninth Circuit, therefore,
affirmed the decision of the district
court and upheld the Service's
population viability and cumulative
effects analysis.
- by Constance S. Chandler
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAM
Reynolds, et al. v. Buchholzer, et al.,
87 F.3d 827 (6th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs were commercial
fisheries who brought suit against
Frances S. Buchholzer, as Director of
the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, and Richard B. Pierce,
Chief of the Division of Wildlife, and
George B. Voinovich, Ohio State
Governor. Plaintiffs argued that the
regulations and state statutes
prohibiting the commercial fishing of
walleye and yellow perch were
unconstitutional in that they violated
the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio
granted defendants' motion to
dismiss, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit began its
analysis by noting that state laws that
regulated fish and wildlife protection
are within the reach of the Commerce
Clause.
The court next applied the
two-part test established by
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456,101 S.Ct.715,66
L.Ed.2d 659(1981). First, the court
found that the Ohio statutes in
question did not constitute "simple
economic protectionism" because the
statutes did not favor Ohio fishermen
over out-of-state fishermen. The
plaintiffs had attempted to show that
the statutes discriminated against in-
state fishermen by implying that the
actual goal of the statutes was to
promote the economic interests of
Ohio's tourism industry. The plaintiffs
58 MELPR
also asserted that the statutes were
discriminatory against them in that
they promoted sport fishing while
harming the nation's food industry.
The court found that such regulation
would not be a per se violation of the
Constitution because the allocation of
resources by the statute was not
arbitrary or capricious, and did not
infringe upon any fundamental right.
After successfully passing
the first phase of the Clover Leaf test,
the statutes then were analyzed to
determine if their effect on interstate
commerce was "clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."
The court found that the local benefits
of the statutes appeared to outweigh
any burden imposed on interstate
commerce because of the "substantial
state interest in promoting
conservation of natural resources."
Therefore, because the statutes did
not impose a "clearly excessive"
burden on interstate commerce, they
did not violate the Commerce Clause.
Plaintiffs argued, however,
that the statutes did not promote
conservation of natural resources, but
merely benefited sport fisherman while
they harmed commercial fishermen.
The court stated that even if this were
true, benefiting sport fishermen may
reflect a legitimate state interest and
therefore would not invalidate the
statutes. Because the plaintiffs could
not show that the statutes failed the
test established in Clover Leaf, the
court held the commercial fishing
statutes to be valid.
- by Cynthia Giltner
NWPA
Indiana Michigan Power Company v.
Department of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272
(D.C.Cir. 1996).
The Utility and State
Commissions, which paid fees
pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (NWPA), sought reveiw of an
order of the Department of Energy
(DOE) declaring that the DOE was not
obligated to dispose of high-level
radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) in the absence of an operational
repository or an interim storage
facility constructed under the NWPA.
The Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982 ("NWPA") allowed the
.Secretary of Energy to enter into
contracts with the owners and
generators of radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel (hereafter referred
to as "SNF"). Under the terms of the
NWPA the private parties are to pay
the Secretary fees set forth in the
statute. In return, the Secretary,
"beginning not later than January 31,
1998, will dispose of the high-level
radioactive waste or SNF involved".
42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B) (1994).
In 1993, several parties who
entered into agreements with the
Secretary, including states and
utilities, became concerned with the
DOE's ability to meet its obligations
by the January 31, 1998,deadline. The
DOE responded in February 1994, by
issuing a letter stating that the DOE
did not have a "clear legal obligation
under the NWPA to accept SNF
absent an operational repository or
other facility constructed under the
NWPA". In its final interpretation,
issued on April 28, 1995, the DOE
concluded that it had neither an
unconditional statutory or contractual
obligation to accept SNF in the
absence of a repository or interim
storage facility constructed under the
NWPA. The DOE also concluded that
the DOE had no authority to provide
interim storage in the absence of a
facility constructed under the NWPA.
Review of the DOE's final
interpretation of the construction of a
statute is governed by Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Under the 2-step analysis in
Chevron, the Court must first ask
whether Congress has spoken
unambiguously to the question at
hand. If so, then the Court must
follow that language. If not, the Court
must apply the second step and
determine if the agency's
interpretation is "reasonable and
consistent with the statute's
purpose."
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit,
the utilities and state commissions
argued that § 302(a)(5)(B) means what
it says, that "in return for the payment
of fees... [DOE], beginning not later
than January 31, 1998, will dispose of
the [SNF]," and that DOE must begin
accepting SNF on or before January
31, 1998. The DOE contended that the
obligation was conditioned on the
availability of a repository or other
facility authorized, constructed, and
licensed in accordance with the
NWPA. The DOE based its argument
on interpretation of the statute as a
whole. They argued that use of the
term "dispose" created such a
condition because "disposal" was
defined by the statute as "the
emplacement in a repository of. ..
spent nuclear fuel . . . with no
foreseeable intent of recovery." DOE
stated that "dispose," as a different
grammatical form of "disposal," was
intended by Congress to have the
same interpretation.
The Court rejected the DOE's
interpretation because there was no
indication in the statute that Congress
intended the words to be used in any
way but according to common sense.
Therefore, "dispose" should be given
its common meaning, including "to get
rid of; throw away; discard." The
Court concluded that even in light of
the definition of "disposal" there was
no evidence of the limited use of
"dispose" supported by the DOE.
The DOE also argued that
subsections (A) and (B) of 302(a)(5)
should have been read together to
create one requirement because title
and disposal cannot be separated.
The Court rejected this argument
stating that the subsections clearly
set forth independent requirements.
The Court also concluded that
although Congress intended a
repository by 1998, the absence of
such a facility did not make
subsection (B) illogical and only
effected the remedy they could
provide.
The Court's final conclusion
was that § 302(a)(5)(B) created an
obligation on the part of DOE to start
disposing of the SNF no later than
January3l, 1998.
- by Tom Collins
OlTER
Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc.,
No. 95-4227,1996 WL 431157(8th Cir.
August 2, 1996).
The facts in this case are
undisputed. Willamette Industries
(Willamette) owns a plant that
manufactures fiberboard in Malvern,
Arkansas. Pine wood shavings and
wood pulp are reduced to a fiber, and
mixed with urea formaldehyde, and is
then dried into the fiberboard.
Particulate matter, that had been
treated with formaldehyde, from this
manufacturing process, is emitted into
the air through the normal course of
production.
The Wright family, who lived
near the Willamette plant, filed a toxic
tort against Willamette. The Wrights
alleged a variety of ailments attributed
to breathing in the formaldehyde
treated particulate matter emissions
from the nearby plant. The district
court jury awarded $226,250 in
damages based on the negligence
claim.
Willamette filed a post-
verdict motion for a judgment as a
matter of law contending that the
Wrights failed to present a
submissible case based on negligence
due to the lack of evidence of
proximate cause. The district court
denied the motion and Willamette
appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit examined
the issue of what constitutes
proximate cause of injuries. Proximate
cause in Arkansas has been defined
as the cause which inflicted damage to
a party which occurred in a logical
progression without which the
damage would never have been
inflicted. The Wrights alleged that the
proximate cause of their injuries was
the formaldehyde treated emissions
they inhaled.
Willamette, however,
contended that the Wrights had to
affirmatively demonstrate that they
were actually exposed to levels of
formaldehyde treated particulate
matter emitted from the Willamette
plant and that the levels were high
enough to cause the alleged ailments.
The Eighth Circuit agreed
with Willamette, and reversed the
district court's denial of judgment as
matter of law, and set aside the jury
award for damages. The Court held
that for a toxic tort plaintiff to recover
she must prove that the levels of
exposure to the toxic substance are
hazardous to humans, and also must
show the actual level of exposure to
the plaintiff.
- by Christopher Pickett
Alliance Against IFQs v. Ronald H.
Brown, Secretary of Commerce, 84
F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiffs are a group of
fisherman and others who claim they
suffered from the economic impact of
regulation of commercial fishing of
halibut and sablefish from waters of
the northern Pacific Ocean.
Defendants include the Secretary of
Commerce and others in charge of
regulating fishery management.
Plaintiffs sought to challenge the
Secretary's regulation of a fishery
management plan, and argued that the
plan was created arbitrarily and
capriciously in that the plan did not
properly consider the "present
participation" in the fishery. Plaintiffs
also challenged the Secretary's
decision to include a certain port in
the regulatory list of approved
transfer locations, and that the
regulations violated the legally
protected interests of individual
fishermen. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's decision upholding
the Secretary's regulation of the
commercial fisheries in question.
The Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act,
16 U.S.C. §1801 et seq., recognized
that some stocks of fish had been
harvested nearly to the point of
extinction and needed federal
protection to ensure conservation of
certain fish. Pursuant to this Act and
the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of
1982, the Secretary of Commerce
implemented a management plan for
sablefish and halibut fishing in the
waters of the Gulf of Alaska, the
Bering Sea, and the waters off the
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Aleutian Islands. 50 C.F.R. §
676.10(b).
The plan required that any
boat that fishes commercially for the
regulated fish in the regulated area
must obtain an individual quota share
permit, specifying the individual
fishing quota allowed for the vessel.
Plaintiffs complained of the method
used for calculating the quota share
because it w as based on the number
of landings of halibut and sablefish
that an "owner or lessee of a [fishing]
vessel" made during the years 1988,
1989, or 1990. Plaintiffs argued a
person who had not fished those
years, or who was not an owner or
lessee of a fishing vessel suffered an
economic loss by not being able to
obtain a quota share permit (unless
they were able to purchase a quota
share from a willing seller).
When the Secretary
establishes a plan which limits access
to commercial fishing, the Secretary
must "take into account present
participation in the fishery." 16 U.S.C.
§ I853(b)(6)(A). Plaintiffs argued that
since the plan was promulgated in
1993 (58 Fed.Reg. 59,375 (1993)) yet
based the quotas on 1988, 1989 and
1990, the Secretary violated the
Magnuson Act by not taking into
account the present participation.
The Ninth Circuit, however, noted that
the Secretary had several reasons for
choosing the 1990 cutoff date. In the
environmental impact statement
concerning the proposed regulations,
it was noted that if participation in the
fishery while the rule was under
consideration had been considered,
people would have fished and
invested in boats in order obtain
quota shares, even though that would
have exacerbated overcapacity. Even
so, this does not answer the plaintiffs'
argument that the Secretary exceeded
the time allowed him for issuing
regulations as is required by the
Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a).
By not meeting the timetable
established by statute, the plaintiffs
argued that the Secretary "pushed
what was supposed to be 'present'
participation in the fishery further into
the past." 84 F.3d 347.
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The Ninth Circuit, although
concerned with the Secretary's delay
in establishing the regulations, did not
find the delay to be a reason to
change the result of the regulations.
Because Congress left the Secretary
room for discretion by not defining
'present participation,' and by listing
it as only one of many factors which
'the Secretary must 'take into account'
the court found that the final
regulations were promulgated in a time
"roughly 'present' with the time when
the regulations were first proposed"
and that this was sufficient. The
Ninth Circuit thereby established that
'present' could not-prudently be
contemporaneous with the
promulgation of the final regulations.
Hence, the court found that the length
of time between the end of the
participation period considered and
the promulgation of the rule was
reasonable, and therefore not
"arbitrary or capricious."
The plaintiffs next argued
that the "allocation of quota shares to
vessel owners and lessees violate[d]
the statutory requirement that
allocation be 'fair and equitable to all
such fishermen"' as required by the
Magnuson Act at 16 U.S.C. §
1851 (a)(4). The court noted, however,
that the Act also requires the
Secretary to, inter alia, "prevent
overfishing" and "promote
conservation." The inconsistencies
and tension among the several
objectives almost certainly require the
Secretary to favor one objective over
another. The court noted that the
Secretary favored allocating quota
shares to owners and lessees for
several reasons. First, it was easier to
ascertain the amount of fish taken by
a boat than the amount taken by
individual fishermen. Second, the
Secretary expressed that equity
required a recognition of those who
had invested financially in the
operation of the boats. Since vessel
owners and lease holders are the
participants who supply the means to
harvest fish, they suffer the financial
and liability risks to do so, and hence,
if anyone must be fa*vored over
another, the risk-takers and financial
backers should be rewarded with the
quota permits. Citing to case law, the
Ninth Circuit noted that unless the
Secretary acts in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in promulgating
such regulations, they may not be
declared invalid. Additionally, the
"Secretary is allowed.. . to sacrifice
the interest of some groups of
fishermen for the benefit . .. of the
fishery as a whole." Alaska Factory
TrawlerAss'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d
1456, 1460(9th Cir.1987)
The plaintiffs' next main
complaint was the Secretary's
decision to designate a port in the
state of Washington as a port where
fish can be unloaded and transferred
from the harvest vessels. Plaintiffs
argued that this listing was
inappropriate because they feared
some vessels will harvest regulated
fish in waters off Alaska, and then
cheat by selling fish before they
arrived The Ninth Circuit, however,
found that the Secretary had two
good reasons for listing the
Washington port. First, the Secretary
believed that to not designate a port
outside Alaska would violate the U.S.
Constitution at Art I, Sec. 9, para. 6
which requires that "[no Preference
shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce . .. to the Ports of one State
over those of another." 84 F.3d 350.
Second, the Washington port had
been one which historically had been
a port where the selling of halibut and
sablefish had occurred. Once again,
the court found that the Secretary's
decision in this regard had not been
arbitrary and capricious.
In conclusion, the court
noted that this was a particularly
troubling case because some
"[plerfectly innocent people going
about their legitimate business in a
productive industry have suffered
great economic harm because the
federal regulatory scheme changed."
84 F.3d at 352. It went on to note,
however, that "regulation of an
industry necessarily transfers
economic rewards from some who are
more efficient and hardworking to
others who are favored by the
regulatory scheme," yet the court
could not say that the Secretary's
decision was arbitrary and capricious,
nor contrary to law.
- by Cynthia Giltner
Oregon Natural Resources Council
v. Thomas, No.95-36256, 1996 WL
426852 (9th Cir. July 31, 1996).
This case involved an appeal
from a decision in the United States
District Court for the District of
Oregon to determine whether the
review of certain timber sales was
proper under the Administrative
Procedure Act. The plaintiffs were
Oregon Natural Resources Council
and Umpqua Watersheds, Inc., a
group of environmentalists who were
attempting to prevent the sale of
timber by the United States Forest
Service at Pinestrip and Snog, areas
located in the North Umpqua River
Basin in southeastern Oregon. The
high bidders on the two sales were
intervenors to the suit: Huffman and
Wright Logging Company, Inc. and
Douglas Timber Operators, Inc.
The questionable sales
concerned timber that exists on land
subject to the President's Northwest
Forest Plan commonly called Option 9.
This plan maintains old trees and late
successional forests that extend from
the Canadian border to nothern
California, and manages the trees for
the species living in those forests.
Thirty miles of the nearby North
Umpqua River Basin which flows
through southwestern Oregon has
been dubbed by Congress a "wild and
scenic river," and supports a salmonid
fishery.
The plaintiffs made several
claims against the sale of timber at
Pinestrip and Snog. First, they
claimed that the timber sales would
decrease native species populations
and damage acquatic resources in
violation of the National Forest
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1604(g)(3) and its accompanying
regulations under 36 C.F.R. § 219, et
seq. They also contended that the
sales did not comply with Option 9
which was binding under the National
Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1604(i) and accompanying regulation
36 C.F.R. §§ 219.10(e). Second, the
plaintiffs claimed that the Forest
Service sold the timber capriciously
and arbitrarily under the APA §
706(2)(A), lacking information or
explanation of the environmental
impact on the acquatic and
amphibious species and the
watershed.
Despite the plaintiffs' claims,
the case was dismissed by the lower
court for several reasons. First, the
case was dismissed based on the APA
and the Rescissions Act of 1995. The
current court, in reviewing the
Rescissions Act, found that the Act
did not mandate specific
documentation or procedure for timber
sales that were classified as Option 9.
Therefore, the court found the Forest
Service's sales, along with the
documents and procedures connected
with it, to be in compliance with all
federal environmental and natural
resource laws.
In addition to its finding that
the plaintiffs' case failed to comply
with the APA and Recissions Act, the
lower court also found that since
judicial review of an agency action
was forbidden under 5 U.S.C. §
701 (a)(2), and that the sale of timber
was an act of discretion by the
agency, the case lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. In their appeal, plaintiffs
contended that this analysis was in
direct contrast with the Rescissions
Act § 2001 (f)(1), which provided that
subsection (d) timber sales are subject
to judicial review. Nonetheless, the
Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
could only prevail if the Rescissions
Act insulated subsection 2001(d)
sales from judicial scrutiny, other than
arbitrary and capricious review under
the APA § 706(2)(A). Because the Act
allowed legal challenges based on
federal contract law, a violation of log
export laws or some other sort of non-
environmental law other than the
APA, subsection § 2001(f)(1) was not
rendered meaningless as plaintiffs
claim. Furthermore, the court
interpreted the language in 2001(d)
"notwithstanding any other law" to
direct the disregard of only
environmental laws. The court based
its conclusion on both previous case
law in the Ninth Circuit and
Congressional intent. Therefore, the
court held that the provision for
judicial review for Option 9 sales in
subsection 2001 (f)(1) is not
meaningless even if arbitrary and
capricious review is not unavailable
under the APA.
The plaintiffs' third claim
argued that an agency's sale of
Option 9 timber was not discretionary
because it has typically and
traditionally been reviewabic. The
court, however, ruled that because
plaintiffs did not show that any
relevant statute other than the APA
required the Forest Service to obtain
the environmental impact information
necessary according to the plaintiffs,
agency actions were not reviewable as
arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, the plaintiffs argued
that the review could still be
conducted under the APA,
independent of another statute, citing
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The
court rejected this suggestion,
holding that review was unavailable
under the APA § 706(2)(A) unless a
law applies under § 701 (a)(2).
Therefore, the judgment of the district
court was affirmed and the plaintiffs'
case was dismissed.
- by Wendy Hickey
Citizens for a Better Environment v.
The Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir.
1996).
This case involves an issue
of first impression in the Seventh
Circuit, and only the second occasion
a federal appellate court has
addressed the question involved. In
1995, Citizens for Better Environment
(CBE) discovered what it believed to
be multiple violations of the
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPRCA)
§§ 312 and 313 by The Steel Company
(Steel), a manufacturer and pickier of
steel. CBE provided 60 day notice to
the proper authorities on March 16,
1995, alleging that Steel failed to
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submit a toxic chemical inventory or
release form. Upon receipt of notice,
Steel proceeded to file the appropriate,
although overdue, forms. Because the
EPA failed to initiate an enforcement
proceeding, CBE brought a citizen
enforcement suit against Steel under
EPCRA, Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ I 1001 et
seq.
In its complaint, CBE argued
that EPCRA authorized citizen suits to
enforce the statutorily prescribed
filing deadlines. However, the district
court, relying on Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. United Musical
Instruments U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473
(6th Cir. 1995), dismissed the suit
because Steel's filings were current
when CBE filed the complaint, making
the alleged violations purely
historical. CBE appealed the district
court's decision.
On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit
holding in United Musical
Instruments, which ruled that EPCRA
required forms are considered
completed and filed, even if such
forms are filed late. United Musical
Instruments relied on the Supreme
Court decision in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987),
which interpreted the citizen suit
provisions of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) to require a present, ongoing
violation before a citizen suit could be
instituted. In addition, Gwaltney
pointed out the use of present tense
throughout the statute, which also
indicated congressional intent to
require a continuing violation.
Moreover, the Gwaltney Court found
that CWA's 60 day notice provision
was established to give the alleged
violator an opportunity to bring itself
into compliance, rendering a citizen
suit unnecessary. When interpreting
the citizen suit provisions of EPCRA
the Seventh Circuit used the same
reasoning as did the Gwaltney Court
when interpreting the citizen suit





language which authorizes citizen
suits for "failure to complete and
submit forms under §§ 312 and 313" to
mean in accordance with those
sections. The court decided the
failure to timely file §§ 312 and 313
reports would not be in accordance
with those sections and thus
authorized by EPCRA. In addition,
the Seventh Circuit pointed out that
present tense language was absent
from the EPCRA enforcement
provisions. Therefore, the court
concluded that this past tense
language further evidences Congress'
ability to require allegations of an
ongoing violation as a prerequisite to
citizen suit.
In conclusion, the Seventh
Circuit held that EPCRA citizen suits
are not reserved for only ongoing
violations. The court determined that
the EPCRA notice provisions are not
gratuitous, and exist to provide an
opportunity for the alleged violator to
mediate their exposure to penalties.
Moreover, the court remarked that to
follow the Sixth Circuit decision in
United Musical Instruments would
undermine EPCRA because citizens
would have no incentive to invest
time and money to investigate what
will inevitably become a historical
violation. Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court's decisions.
-by Rebecca J. Grosser
Mausolfy. Babbitt, No. 95-1201 MN,
1996 WL 2888057 (8h Cir. June 3, 1996).
The right of intervention was
the focus of this action. The
plaintiffs, snowmobiling enthusiasts,
brought suit against the government
to enjoin its execution of laws which
would restrict their sport within a
Minnesota national park, Voyageurs
Region National Park. The
association of this park sought to
intervene on the concern that the
government may settle with plaintiffs
or compromise the current restrictions.
The district court denied the
association's motion to intervene as
of right and for permissive
intervention, and permitted only
participation as amicus curiae.
Background information
important for this court's opinion
included disputes that occurred in
1991 and 1992 concerning the
potential impact on wildlife in the park
from snowmobiling activity. The
association filed the first suit after the
National Park Service issued final
regulations allowing snowmobiling on
all the park's lakes and several trails
without the input of the association.
In an effort to appease, the National
Park Service, together with the input
of the Fish and Wildlife Service,
proposed a wilderness plan that
closed specified trails, lakes and
shores to snowmobilers. Because a
significant area was affected by this
closure without opportunity for notice
or comment, the snowmobilers filed a
claim against the government
contending the regulations were
arbitrary and capricious. It was this
dispute that the association attempted
to intervene. The association
contended that the government has
long-allowed unrestricted
snowmobiling in the park without
rules protective of park wildlife, and
hence cannot be trusted to represent
the association in this suit.
The plaintiffs argued that the
association lacked standing to
intervene. The district court held that
standing was not necessary to
intervene under Rule 24(a). Rule 24(a)
lists three requirements for
intervention: (1) a recognizable
interest in the lawsuit issues that, (2)
may be impaired, and (3) is not
sufficiently guarded by the parties to
the suit. However, the appellate court
did require standing. The appellate
court stated that a federal case is a
"limited affair." In other words, it is an
Article III case or controversy where
all parties to the suit must have
standing, including an intervenor who
seeks to be a party. Standing, the
court noted, entitles one to a decision
on the merits of a dispute, and since
that is what an intervenor seeks, an
intervenor must not only satisfy Rule
24 requirements but also meet Article
III's demands. Thus, the appellate
court held that the association must
have Article Ill standing to intervene
in the dispute.
The court concluded that the
association did have Article III
standing. Standing requires that the
would-be party suffer injury
connected with the disputed conduct
and likely to be redressed by the relief
sought. It was argued that the injury
the association would incur if the
restrictions were lifted, was
speculative. However, the court held
that the denial of opportunity to
observe several species in their
natural state and the imposition of
park closures without a proper basis
are allegations of "concrete,
particularized, immediate injuries," and
equate the same standing that the
snowmobilers had to bring suit.
In addition, the court
focused on whether it was appropriate
to presume that the government
adequately represented the interests
of the association in accordance with
the doctrine of parens patriae. The
court found that the association
rebutted the presumption that the
government will represent its interests
in court with a well-documented
history of past disputes. In
conclusion, the appellate court
determined that the district court
should have granted the motion to
intervene because the association had
a right to intervention as a matter of
right.
- by Wendy Hickey
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